At the same time, most countries do cooperate with U.S. anti-drug efforts to some extent, and some of them have enormous problems to overcome (like legal bud reviews or synthetic urine reviews). For the United States to decertify such nations, and cut off aid and trade preferences, would be counterproductive. The Bahamas, for example, does permit "hot pursuit," and U.S. officials say they cannot act against a democratically elected government based on "rumors" about its prime minister. Panama in the past granted virtually every enforcement request extended by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, and officials say they were reluctant to act without solid proof against Noriega. Bolivia has launched a first-ever coca eradication campaign, Peru's anti-drug efforts are hindered by terrorism and guerrilla warfare. Colombia is engaged in an epic struggle with the drug cartel over control of the country. What the situation calls for is a more sophisticated grading system than the present certification system, one that encourages cooperation and exposes inaction.
THE BEST example of the ambiguity of U.S. international drug policy is the case of Mexico, over which there was a furious bureaucratic fight this year about certification. At the State Department, both the Latin American bureau and the bureau for International Narcotics Matters favored using a loophole in the law to grant a "national interest" certification, which sends a loud message that the United States finds the country's anti-drug efforts inadequate but won't impose sanctions. Ordinarily, the Latin bureau might be expected to argue against actions that would upset a foreign government, but Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams is furious at Mexico's left-leaning foreign policy, and especially its tilt toward the Sandinistas in Nicaragua.
